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PRESERVING THE INTEGRITY OF THE
COURT AGAINST MORAL DEFILEMENT:
PEOPLE V. WRICE AND THE QUESTION OF
WHETHER THE USE OF A PHYSICALLY
COERCED CONFESSION CAN CONSTITUTE
HARMLESS ERROR - LESSONS OF WISDOM
FROM INTERNATIONAL LAW
BY STEVEN W. BECKER*
"[Pilate] took water, and washed his hands
before the multitude, saying, I am innocent of the
blood of this just person."
-Matthew 27:24
However one judges the actions of Pontius Pilate on that fate-
ful day in history more than two thousand years ago, on that
occasion Pilate enunciated a timeless principle of jurisprudence,
viz., that irrespective of the external pressures exerted on a tri-
bunal - whether they be political or prosecutorial, a court must
always maintain its integrity, lest it be deemed complicit in a
conviction effected through the moral defilement of its judicial
process. In the last decade, this is a theme that courts have had
to repeatedly confront in the prosecution of terrorism cases fol-
lowing the events of September 11, 2001.1 Now, it is the turn of
* Founding member of the law firm of Becker Stephenson LLC in Chicago,
Illinois; former Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate
Defender, Chicago; Deputy Secretary General, International Association of
Penal Law (France). The views expressed herein are the author's own and do
not necessarily represent the views of the organizations with which he is
associated.
I See Steven W. Becker, Closing the Door on Justice: Secret Evidence and the
Lack of Transparency in Court Proceedings in the Wake of the "War on Ter-
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the Illinois Supreme Court to test its moral fortitude in a case
involving police torture and the State's invitation to change ex-
isting law to permit prosecutors to use physically coerced con-
fessions as substantive evidence of guilt at trial without fear that
the judgment will be automatically reversed on appeal. 2
The case of People v. Stanley Wrice is factually unique be-
cause Wrice has abundant medical evidence to corroborate his
claim that he was tortured by Chicago police personnel during
his interrogation in 1982.3 The case is historically important be-
cause the Illinois Supreme Court has not addressed a Burge tor-
ture case in more than a decade, 4 and this is the first such case it
has entertained since former Commander Jon Burge's convic-
tion and sentence on federal charges of obstruction of justice
and perjury for lying about his knowledge of the torture of crim-
inal suspects. 5 Finally, the case is legally significant because the
Court has granted the State's petition for leave to appeal to re-
visit its long-standing pronouncement that "[t]he use of a defen-
dant's coerced confession as substantive evidence of his guilt is
never harmless error." 6
The purpose of this article is to analyze this vital legal issue
from the perspective of international law sources in the hopes
that such collective wisdom may provide guidance to the Court
in its resolution of the narrow question before it. As demon-
strated below, this question has been extensively litigated in
rorism," in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE FUTURE UNCHAINED?, at 1-17
(Steven W. Becker & Davor Deren~inovia eds., 2008) (addressing criminal,
immigration, and civil cases in which courts were faced with the tension be-
tween adhering to traditional court procedures and the unique challenges
raised by terrorism cases).
2 People v. Stanley Wrice, No. 111860, leave to appeal granted, 350 I11. Dec.
872, 949 N.E.2d 664 (Ill. Mar. 30, 2011).
3 See People v. Wrice, 406 I11. App. 3d 43, 45 (1st Dist. 2010).
4 The last time being in People v. Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d 93 (2000).
5 See Annie Sweeney, Burge Gets 41/2 Years: Judge Scolds Authorities for Not
Probing Former Cop's Alleged Torture Decades Ago, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 22,
2011, at 1.
6 People v. Wilson, 116 I11. 2d 29, 41 (1987).
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5 PEOPLE V. WRICE
front of the European Court of Human Rights, which has con-
sistently determined that the introduction of evidence obtained
by physical torture can never constitute harmless error because
its use violates the right to a fair trial. Moreover, high courts
from around the world have declared that a new trial is always
required in such instances because to allow any conviction so
defiled by torture to stand would be to irreparably compromise
the integrity of the judicial process.
Part I provides a brief background on the Wrice case in order
to set the stage for the present posture of the case in the Illinois
Supreme Court. Part II gives an overview of international in-
struments condemning torture. Part III analyzes the principal
issue at bar in Wrice relating to physical torture and harmless
error. Part IV describes the distinction between physical torture
and threats of violence. Lastly, Part V explains the importance
of preserving the integrity of the judicial process by categorically
forbidding the State's use of evidence procured by physical
coercion.
I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF Wrice CASE
Stanley Wrice was arrested on September 9, 1982, along with
a number of other suspects, in connection with the sexual assault
of K.B.7 During the subsequent hearing on his motion to sup-
press the confession, Wrice testified that he had been severely
beaten by Sergeant John Byrne and Detective Peter Dignan in
the basement of Area 2 police headquarters. 8 In particular,
Wrice testified that Byrne struck him on multiple occasions with
a flashlight that was approximately fifteen to sixteen inches in
length and that Dignan repeatedly struck him with a solid piece
of rubber.9 Furthermore, during his second trip to the base-
ment, "Sergeant Byrne then told defendant to stand up. He did
7 Wrice, supra note 3, at 44.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 44-45.
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so. Sergeant Byrne turned defendant around so his back was
facing them, put his hands over his head, and kicked his legs
apart. Then Sergeant Byrne hit defendant multiple times in the
groin with the flashlight. Detective Dignan also hit defendant in
the groin with the piece of rubber."' 0 According to the assistant
state's attorney, thereafter, Wrice gave several oral statements.
The following day, Wrice was examined by a Cook County
paramedic, who filled out paperwork memorializing his observa-
tion of Wrice's injuries from the waist up." Five days later,
Wrice was examined by a physician at Cermak Health Services,
who "noted multiple healing bruises on defendant's left anterior
leg," after which he concluded that Wrice "had a history of mul-
tiple blunt trauma."'12 Byrne and Dignan denied that they physi-
cally abused Wrice while he was in custody. 13 Despite the
medical confirmation of injury, the trial court denied Wrice's
motion to suppress, finding that the officers were credible
witnesses. 14
Following a trial, at which the evidence showed that the vic-
tim, K.B., had been beaten, raped, and severely burned while at
Wrice's residence,' 5 the jury convicted Wrice of rape and devi-
ant sexual assault, as well as armed violence and unlawful re-
straint.16 Wrice was sentenced, inter alia, to consecutive terms
of imprisonment of sixty years and forty years for rape and devi-
ant sexual assault, respectively. 17
On direct appeal, Wrice's convictions and sentences on the
rape and deviant sexual assault charges were affirmed; however,
the reviewing court vacated the armed violence and unlawful re-
10 Id. at 45.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 46.
16 Id. at 48.
17 Id.
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7 PEOPLE V. WRICE
straint convictions.18 In April 1991, Wrice filed his first post-
conviction petition, wherein he alleged, among others issues,
that his constitutional rights had been transgressed because
Byrne and Dignan beat him while in custody. 19 This petition
was summarily dismissed, which dismissal was subsequently af-
firmed by the appellate court.20 Then, in May 2000, Wrice filed
his first successive post-conviction petition, asserting, among
other claims, that, as a result of his being tortured by Byrne and
Dignan, his confession was involuntary.21 After counsel was ap-
pointed, the circuit court granted the State's motion to dismiss,
which dismissal was upheld on review.22
In October 2007, Wrice filed a petition for leave to file a sec-
ond successive post-conviction petition asserting that he had
new evidence, viz., the 2006 Report of the Special State's Attor-
ney (Report),23 to corroborate his claim that his confession was
extracted by means of physical torture and that one of the wit-
nesses who testified against him at trial, Bobbie Jo Williams, was
likewise beaten in order to procure false testimony against
him. 24 The trial court denied Wrice leave to file this second suc-
cessive petition.25
The First District Appellate Court, however, reversed the
lower court's decision and held that Wrice had satisfied the
cause-and-prejudice test,26 which is a statutory prerequisite for
18 People v. Wrice, 140 Il1. App. 3d 494, 502 (1st Dist. 1986).
19 Wrice, supra note 3, at 48.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 48-49.
23 For a brief overview of the circumstances surrounding the appointment of
the Special State's Attorney, the 2006 Report of the Special State's Attorney,
and criticisms of it, see Steven W. Becker, When Judges Judge Themselves:
The Chicago Police Torture Scandal and the Continuing Quest for Justice in
the Case of People v. Keith Walker, 3 DEPAUL J. Soc. JUST. 115, 120-25
(2010).
24 Wrice, supra note 3, at 50.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 52-53.
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filing a successive post-conviction petition.27 With respect to
"cause," the reviewing court ruled that the release of the Report
in 2006 constituted an objective factor that prevented Wrice
from raising his claim in earlier post-conviction proceedings.28
With regard to the "prejudice" prong of the test, the appellate
court noted that the Report was not cumulative, that the Illinois
Supreme Court declared that "[t]he use of a defendant's coerced
confession as substantive evidence of his guilt is never harmless
error," and that Wrice had satisfied the criteria enunciated in
People v. Patterson29 for avoiding claims of res judicata in tor-
ture cases, in that Wrice: "(1) consistently claimed, during his
motion to suppress, at trial, and on postconviction review, that
he was tortured; (2) his claims of being beaten are strikingly
similar to those of other prisoners at Areas 2 and 3; (3) the of-
ficers involved, Sergeant Byrne and Detective Dignan, are iden-
tified in other allegations of torture; and (4) defendant's
allegations are consistent not only with OPS findings (under the
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof) of systemic
and methodical torture at Area 2 under Jon Burge, but also with
the Report's findings of torture under the stricter standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 30  Accordingly, the First
District reversed the decision of the trial court and remanded
the case for a third-stage evidentiary hearing on Wrice's torture
claims.31
The Special State's Attorney then filed a petition for leave to
appeal in which he asked the Illinois Supreme Court to recon-
sider its position that the use of a coerced confession at trial can
never be harmless error.32 On March 30, 2011, the Court al-
27 See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West 2006).
28 Wrice, supra note 3, at 52.
29 192 Il1. 2d 93, 154 (2000).
30 Wrice, supra note 3, at 52-53 (quoting People v. Wilson, supra note 6, at 41
(1987) (emphasis added in Wrice)).
31 Id. at 55.
32 Special State's Attorney, Petition for Leave to Appeal, Case No. 111860,
at 7-11 (on file with author).
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9 PEOPLE V. WRICE
lowed the Special State's Attorney's petition for leave to
appeal. 33
II. OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
CONDEMNING TORTURE
The United States Supreme Court has declared that "[t]he
opinion of the world community, while not controlling our out-
come, does provide respected and significant confirmation for
our own conclusions." 34 In fact, the United States Supreme
Court has made increasing reference to the instructive nature of
"the laws of other countries and to international authorities," 35
in a series of landmark decisions over the past decade. 36
In this regard, it is well established that "official torture is
now prohibited by the law of nations." 37 In particular, "the pro-
hibition against torture became widely regarded as a customary
norm [of international law] in the 1980s even before the prohibi-
tion was codified in a binding treaty . *."..38 Similarly, "[n]o
citation of authority is required for the proposition that in a civi-
33 People v. Wrice, supra note 2.
34 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S 551, 578 (2005).
35 Id. at 575.
36 See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033-34 (2010) (holding that
the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of a life-without-parole sen-
tence on juvenile offenders, wherein the Court continued its "longstanding
practice in noting the global consensus against the sentencing practice in
question"); Roper, supra note 34, at 575-78 (citing extensively to interna-
tional and regional conventions in barring the imposition of the death penalty
for juveniles); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003) (referring to
parallel case decided by the European Court of Human Rights in supporting
its decision to strike down criminal statute prohibiting consensual sodomy);
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (supporting its conclusion
with reference to the fact that "within the world community, the imposition
of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is
overwhelmingly disapproved").
37 Filartiga v. Peila-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980).
38 Paul R. Dubinsky, International Law in the Legal System of the United
States, 58 AM. J. CoMp. L. 455, 465 (2010).
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lized society torture by police officers is an unacceptable means
of obtaining confessions from suspects." 39
The 1984 United Nations Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(Torture Convention), which was ratified by the United States
on October 21, 1994, defines "torture," in pertinent part, as:
"[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such pur-
poses as obtaining from him or a third person information or a
confession . "..."40 Article 2 of said Convention provides that
"[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever... may be invoked
as a justification of torture. 41 More specifically, Article 15 of
the Torture Convention mandates that "[e]ach State Party shall
ensure that any statement which is established to have been
made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in
any proceedings, except against a person accused of torture as
evidence that the statement was made." 42 Although Article 15
does not explicitly address the issue of harmless error, the An-
notations to Article 15 state that "it is clear that a statement
made under torture is often an unreliable statement, and it
could therefore be contrary to the principle of 'fair trial' to in-
voke such statement before a court. Even in countries whose
court procedures are based on a free evaluation of all evidence,
it is hardly acceptable that a statement made under torture
should be allowed to play any part in court proceedings." 43
Furthermore, the recent Resolution of the United Nations
Human Rights Council on the subject of "Torture and other
39 People v. Cannon, 293 11. App. 3d 634, 639 (1st Dist. 1997).
40 G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 1, & 1, U.N. GAOR 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N.
Doc. A/39/51 (Dec. 10, 1984) [hereinafter Torture Convention].
41 Id., art. 2, & 2.
42 Id., art. 15.
43 J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CON-
VENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT 147-48 (1988).
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cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment: the role
and responsibility of judges, prosecutors and lawyers" expressly
"condemns any action or attempt by States or public officials to
legalize, authorize or acquiesce in torture and other cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment under any circum-
stances, including on grounds of national security or through
judicial decisions."44 In addition, numerous international instru-
ments condemn the use of torture, including, most notably, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights45 and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.46 Torture is likewise
prohibited in all major regional conventions. 47
Finally, it is particularly significant that in its conclusions and
recommendations of July 2006, the United Nations Committee
Against Torture highlighted the failure of local governmental
authorities to investigate and prosecute allegations of torture in-
volving detectives working under the command of former Com-
mander Jon Burge: "The Committee is concerned with
allegations of impunity of some of the State party's law-enforce-
ment personnel in respect of acts of torture or cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment or punishment. The Committee notes
the limited investigation and lack of prosecution in respect of
the allegations of torture perpetrated in areas 2 and 3 of the
Chicago Police Department. ' 48
44 U.N. Human Rights Council, Res. 13/19, art. 9, 13th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/
HRC/RES/13/19 (Apr. 15, 2010) (second emphasis added).
45 G.A. Res. 217 A (III), art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
46 G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), art. 7, entered into force March 23, 1976, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
47 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, art. 3, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953 (Nov. 4, 1950)
[hereinafter European Convention]; American Convention on Human
Rights, art. 5, entered into force July 18, 1978 (Nov. 22, 1969); African Charter
of Human and Peoples' Rights, art. 5, entered into force Oct. 21, 1986 (June
27, 1981).
48 U.N. Committee Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention, & 25, CAT/C/USA/CO/2
(July 25, 2006).
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HI. PHYSICAL TORTURE AND HARMLESS ERROR
As noted above, the European Court of Human Rights (Eu-
ropean Court) has dealt extensively with the question of the use
of tortured confessions in criminal trials and its impact upon the
denial of a fair trial, irrespective of the existence of other evi-
dence of guilt. To better understand the interplay between these
two important principles in the European Court's jurisprudence,
it is helpful to reiterate the two relevant articles from the Euro-
pean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms (European Convention) at issue,' viz.,
Articles 3 and 6(1).
Article 3 addresses the prohibition on torture: "No one shall
be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment."49 Article 6(1), on the other hand, concerns the
right to a fair trial and reads, in pertinent part: "In the determi-
nation of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is enti-
tled to a fair ... hearing . . by [a] ... tribunal." 50
In particular, the European Court has consistently held that,
in contrast to evidence that may simply have been obtained in
violation of domestic law (for example, through improper elec-
tronic surveillance), different "considerations apply in respect of
the use in criminal proceedings of evidence obtained in breach
of Article 3," i.e., by means of torture. 51 As such, the use of
evidence extracted by torture "always raises serious issues as to
the fairness of the proceedings, even if the admission of such evi-
dence was not decisive in securing a conviction."52 This is be-
49 European Convention, supra note 47, art. 3.
50 Id. at art. 6(1).
51 Gafgen v. Germany (Gr. Chamber), no. 22978/05, 165 (June 1, 2010). See
Harutyunyan v. Armenia, no. 36549/03, 62-63 (June 28, 2007); Jalloh v. Ger-
many (Gr. Chamber), no. 54810/00, 98-99 (July 11, 2006).
52 Gdfgen, supra note 51, at 165 (emphasis added). See Levinfa v. Moldova,
no. 17332/03, 99 (Dec. 16, 2008); Harutyunyan, supra note 51, at 63; Giimen
v. Turkey, no. 72000/01, 73 (Oct. 17, 2006); Jalloh, supra note 51, at 99; Igiz v.
Turkey (dec.), no. 54919/00, 3 (Jan. 9, 2003).
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cause Article 3 "enshrines one of the most fundamental values
of democratic societies," and, "[u]nlike most of the substantive
clauses of the Convention, Article 3 makes no provision for ex-
ceptions and no derogation from it is permissible . -."53
Accordingly, as recently summarized by the Grand Chamber,
the European Court "has found in respect of confessions, as
such, that the admission of statements obtained as a result of
torture54 ... as evidence to establish the relevant facts in crimi-
nal proceedings rendered the proceedings as a whole unfair."55
With great significance for the issue at bar, the Grand Chamber
pointed out that "[t]his finding applied irrespective of the proba-
tive value of the statements and irrespective of whether their use
was decisive in securing the defendant's conviction."56 In short,
the European Court found that the error in introducing a con-
fession obtained by torture could not be harmless and consti-
tuted a violation of the right to a fair trial in transgression of
Article 6(1).
In explaining the European Court's rationale, the following
passage from Harutyunyan v. Armenia is illustrative:
Incriminating evidence, whether in the form of a
confession or real evidence, obtained as a result of
acts of violence or brutality or other forms of
treatment which can be characterised as torture
should never be relied on as proof of the victim's
guilt, irrespective of its probative value. Any
other conclusion would only serve to legitimate in-
directly the sort of morally reprehensible conduct
which the authors of Article 3 of the Convention
53 Jalloh, supra note 51, at 99.
54 Gdfgen, supra note 51, at 166 (citing Harutyunyan, at 63-64, 66; Levinla, at
101, 104-05; and Ors and Others v. Turkey, no. 46213/99, 60 (June 20, 2006)).
55 Id.
56 Id. (emphasis added).
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sought to proscribe or, in other words, to 'afford
brutality the cloak of law.' 57
More specifically, the European Court's judgment in Haruty-
unyan v. Armenia58 directly parallels Mr. Wrice's case. It is im-
portant to note that in Lawrence v. Texas,59 the United States
Supreme Court explicitly relied upon a parallel case from the
European Court to support its decision.60 In the same manner,
the European Court relies upon parallel cases from the United
States, as the Grand Chamber did, for example, in the case of
Jalloh v. Germany,61 wherein the Court not only quoted exten-
sively from the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Rochin v. California,62 but then relied upon language from
Rochin in concluding that the defendant had been denied a fair
trial after being forced to ingest emetics.
In Harutyunyan, the European Court held that the defendant
was deprived of the right to a fair trial due to the use of evi-
dence derived from torture, irrespective of the presence of other
evidence of guilt. The applicant (the defendant in the underly-
ing domestic criminal case) was drafted into the Armenian army
and assigned to a military unit on the border with Azerbaijan.63
In December 1998, serviceman H, one of the six watchmen in
the defendant's unit, was found dead, having been killed by a
machine-gun shot.64 Servicemen T and A were also within the
applicant's unit.65
On March 4, 1999, servicemen T and A were transported to a
military police station, where they were beaten by military po-
57 Harutyunyan, supra note 51, at 63 (quoting Jalloh, supra note 51, at 105
(quoting, in turn, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952))).
58 No. 36549/03 (June 28, 2007).
59 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
60 Id. at 573.
61 (Gr. Chamber), no. 54810/00 (July 11, 2006).
62 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
63 Harutyunyan, supra note 51, at 5.
64 Id. at 7.
65 Id.
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lice officers to force them to confess.66 The following day, the
applicant was brought to the same police station. 67 The appli-
cant was initially punched and kicked. 68 The police officers then
began to hit the applicant with rubber clubs.69 On several occa-
sions, the applicant lost consciousness but was revived and was
again beaten.70 Eventually, the police officers began to squeeze
the applicant's fingernails with pliers.71 The same techniques
were applied to servicemen T and A.72
On March 5, 1999, serviceman T confessed to the investigator
that he had witnessed how the applicant had taken his machine
gun and shot serviceman H.73 Because serviceman A was with
serviceman T at the time of the killing, he was coerced into mak-
ing a statement to the effect that serviceman T had told him that
he had witnessed the murder.74 The police officers continued to
torture the applicant, thereby forcing him to confess to the mur-
der.75 The torture, according to the applicant, continued for a
month.76
On April 16, 1999, the applicant was interrogated as a suspect
by the examining investigator, to whom he confessed that he ac-
cidentally shot serviceman H.77 On April 17, 1999, the applicant
again repeated his confession to the investigator and was for-
mally charged with premeditated murder.78 Upon their release
from the police station, servicemen T and A informed the Ar-
menian military prosecutor that they had been coerced into im-
66 Id. at 8.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 9.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 10.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 11.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 12.
78 Id. at 13.
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plicating the applicant.79 On June 19, 1999, the applicant and
servicemen T and A were given medical examinations during
which various injuries to their fingers and to A's head were
confirmed.80
During proceedings in front of the Syunik Regional Court,
the applicant's lawyer moved to suppress the applicant's confes-
sional statements, as well as the statements made by servicemen
T and A, on the grounds that they were extracted by torture. 81
On June 19, 2002, the Syunik Regional Court found the appli-
cant guilty of premeditated murder and sentenced him to ten
years' imprisonment.8 2 On October 9, 2002, the relevant mili-
tary police officers responsible for torturing the applicant and
servicemen T and A were convicted in a separate criminal pro-
ceeding of abuse of power in connection with this incident and
were sentenced to a term of years.83
The applicant's conviction was upheld on direct appeal by the
Criminal and Military Court of Appeal and was likewise af-
firmed by the Court of Cassation (the supreme court).84
In front of the European Court, the applicant alleged, inter
alia, that the use of evidence obtained by torture (in violation of
Article 3) during the domestic criminal proceedings violated his
right to a fair trial under Article 6(1) of the European Conven-
tion.85 The Armenian government, on the other hand, argued
that, although the applicant and witnesses T and A had been
tortured and had been forced to make statements, its reviewing
court had pointed out that "all the other evidence,... taken in
its entirety, was sufficient to secure the applicant's conviction.
This included various witness statements, expert opinions and
79 Id. at 14.
80 Id. at 15.
81 Id. at 24.
82 Id. at 25.
83 Id. at 24, 29-36.
84 Id. at 37-43.
85 Id. at 57.
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other evidence [such as a ballistic examination confirming that
the shell found at the scene had been fired from the same ma-
chine-gun model as that issued to the applicant];" in short, the
error was harmless.86
The European Court, however, rejected Armenia's harmless
error argument, citing the Court's longstanding maxim that "dif-
ferent considerations apply to evidence recovered by a measure
found to violate Article 3. An issue may arise under Article 6(1)
in respect of evidence obtained in violation of Article 3 of the
Convention, even if the admission of such evidence was not deci-
sive in securing the conviction."87 Because the Armenian courts
relied upon the applicant's tortured confessions as substantive
evidence of his guilt, as well as upon the statements obtained by
physical torture from witnesses T and A that substantiated the
applicant's guilt, the European Court refused to "afford brutal-
ity the cloak of law." 88
Accordingly, the European Court concluded that, "regardless
of the impact the statements obtained under torture had on the
outcome of the applicant's criminal proceedings, the use of such
evidence rendered his trial as a whole unfair" in violation of the
fair trial provision contained in Article 6(1) of the European
Convention.89
Factually and legally, Stanley Wrice's case is strikingly similar
to Harutyunyan. Both Wrice and the applicant were severely
physically tortured by police personnel in order to obtain a con-
fession.90 In fact, both individuals were struck with rubber in-
struments. 91 Substantial medical evidence exists confirming the
physical injuries that each individual sustained while in police
86 Id. at 52-53; see also id. at 28.
87 Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
88 Id. at 63-64.
89 Id. at 66.
90 People v. Wrice, supra note 3, at 44-45 (1st Dist. 2010); Harutyunyan,
supra note 51, at 9-11.
91 Wrice, supra note 3, at 44-45; Harutyunyan, supra note 51, at 9.
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custody.92 Moreover, just as servicemen T and A were tortured
in Harutyunyan to implicate the applicant in the crime, 93 it ap-
pears that at least two witnesses in Wrice's case were also tor-
tured by the police, one of whom was a key witness against
Wrice at trial.94
Furthermore, in both cases, the police officers alleged to have
committed the torture were either convicted of such acts or have
been confirmed to have committed previous acts of torture upon
other suspects.95 Finally, in neither case did the government
contest that torture took place; instead, each asserted (or, in the
present case, asserts) that, despite the presence of torture, the
convictions should be sustained on the basis of harmless error.96
IV. DISTINCTION BETWEEN PHYSICAL TORTURE AND
THREATS OF VIOLENCE
In its brief, the Special State's Attorney asks the Illinois Su-
preme Court to overrule "its outdated position" that "[t]he use
of a defendant's coerced confession as substantive evidence of
his guilt is never harmless error," as expressed in People v. Wil-
son,97 and instead urges the Court to "follow the directive" of
92 Wrice, supra note 3, at 45; Harutyunyan, supra note 51, at 15.
93 Harutyunyan, supra note 51, at 8-9.
94 See Kayla Bensing et al., Tortured Justice, Apr. 27, 2011, available at http://
www.chicagoinnocenceproject.org.
95 Harutyunyan, supra note 51, at 29-36. See, e.g., Edward J. Egan & Robert
D. Boyle, Report of the Special State's Attorney 33-35 (July 19, 2006) (con-
cerning Sergeant Bryne and Detective Dignan); People v. Cannon, 293 I11.
App. 3d 634, 637-38 (1st Dist. 1997) (memorializing testimony documenting
numerous allegations of torture involving Byrne and Dignan); People v.
Banks, 192 Ill. App. 3d 986, 993-94 (1st Dist. 1989) (reversing convictions and
remanding case for new trial based upon evidence of torture committed by
Bryne and Dignan).
96 Harutyunyan, supra note 51, at 53-54; Special State's Attorney, Opening
Brief, Case No. 111860, at 10-13 (on file with author) [hereinafter Opening
Brief].
97 116 Ill. 2d 29 (1987).
Volume 5, Number 1 fall zo011
16
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 3
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol5/iss1/3
19 PEOPLE V. WRICE
Arizona v. Fulminante,98 which applied the harmless error rule
to involuntary confessions.99 In this regard, the Special State's
Attorney writes that "Fulminante directly controls the outcome
of this case" and that "Fulminante compels Defendant's alleged
constitutional violation to be considered a trial error subject to
harmless error review."100
In so doing, however, the Special State's Attorney has failed
to recognize the fundamental legal distinction between physical
torture and threats of violence that is outcome determinative of
whether the harmless error doctrine may be invoked, a distinc-
tion that is similarly reflected in the jurisprudence of the Euro-
pean Court.
Fulminante did not involve allegations of physical torture.
Rather, the defendant in Fulminante was motivated to confess in
order to seek protection because of "fear of physical violence"
that he likely would sustain from other inmates in prison on ac-
count of rumors that he had sexually assaulted and murdered his
young step-daughter. 10 1 In fact, because the case involved only
threats of violence (as opposed to torture), the United States
Supreme Court described the question as to whether the defen-
dant's confession was coerced as "a close one."'10 2
In stark contrast, the case of People v. Wilson,10 3 just as the
present matter, involved overt physical torture inflicted by gov-
ernment officials in an effort to extract a confession. In particu-
lar, Wilson "testified that he was punched, kicked, smothered
with a plastic bag, electrically shocked, and forced against a hot
radiator . . . until he gave his confession."104 Furthermore, just
like in Wrice's case, there was plentiful medical evidence sub-
98 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
99 Opening Brief, supra note 96, at 13.
100 Id. at 11.
'0' Fulminante, supra note 98, at 283, 288.
102 Id. at 287.
103 116 Il1. 2d 29, 41 (1987).
104 Id. at 35.
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stantiating the physical injuries Wilson sustained while in police
custody 0 5
In international law, there is a substantive, definitional differ-
ence between "torture" and "cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment," which is highlighted by Articles 15 and 16
of the Torture Convention. The former, as previously noted, re-
quires that "[e]ach State Party shall ensure that any statement
which is established to have been made as a result of torture
shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except
against a person accused of torture as evidence that the state-
ment was made."10 6 The latter, however, provides that "[e]ach
State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its
jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in ar-
ticle 1, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity."' 10 7 In other words, al-
though State Parties are categorically prohibited from permit-
ting the introduction into evidence of statements procured by
torture, the same mandatory restriction is not imposed vis-d-vis
evidence deriving from official acts of cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment.
In the context of the harmless error doctrine, this very distinc-
tion between physical torture and threats of violence was re-
cently addressed by the European Court in the high-profile case
of Gafgen v. Germany.10 8 Therein, the applicant lured the
youngest son of a German banking family into his flat and killed
him, thereafter demanding ransom money.10 9 After the appli-
cant was arrested, the police discovered half of the ransom
105 Id. at 36-37.
106 Torture Convention, supra note 40, art. 15.
107 Id. at art. 16(1).
108 (Gr. Chamber), no. 22978/05 (June 1, 2010).
109 Id. at 10-12.
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money in the applicant's flat. n10 After consulting with a lawyer,
the applicant told the police that two other individuals had kid-
napped the boy and had hidden him in a hut by a lake."' Be-
lieving that the boy was still alive and in an effort to locate his
whereabouts, a Deputy Chief of the Frankfort police ordered
another officer to threaten the applicant with physical pain.112
More specifically, the officer threatened the applicant that he
would bring in a specialist to inflict pain upon him and further
threatened that the applicant would be "locked up in a cell with
two big 'Negroes' who would anally assault him."'113 Within ten
minutes thereafter, the applicant disclosed the whereabouts of
the boy's body.11 4
In its judgment, the Grand Chamber confirmed its longstand-
ing rule that where evidence procured by torture is introduced
into a criminal trial in violation of Article 3 of the European
Convention, the right to a fair trial under Article 6(1) is auto-
matically breached." 5 Yet, the Court noted that, in one of its
earlier judgments, it had "left open the question whether the use
of real evidence obtained by an act classified as inhuman and
degrading treatment, but falling short of torture, always ren-
dered a trial unfair, that is, irrespective of, in particular, the
weight attached to the evidence. ... 116
Based upon the fact that, at trial, the applicant made a second
confession that was determined to be sufficiently attenuated
from the earlier confession obtained by threats of violence, the
European Court concluded that there was no violation of the
applicant's fair trial rights under Article 6(1) of the European
Convention. 1 7
110 Id. at 13-14.
111 Id. at 14.
112 Id. at 15.
113 Id. at 26.
114 Id. at 16.
115 Id. at 165-167.
116 Id. at 167.
117 Id. at 180, 187-188.
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Thus, Gdfgen demonstrates that there is a fundamental dis-
tinction between cases involving confessions procured by physi-
cal torture, in which the harmless error doctrine is never
applicable, and cases involving threats of violence where, de-
pending upon the particular factual circumstances, the harmless
error doctrine may apply.
V. PRESERVING THE INTEGRITY OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
In addition to "deter[ring] future unlawful police conduct," 118
another principal purpose underlying the exclusionary rule is
"to maintain the integrity of the judicial process."1 19 By way of
illustration, in United States v. Fernandez-Caro,20 the district
court granted the defendant's motion to suppress his confession
based upon the undisputed evidence that, while the defendant
was across the border in Mexico, the Mexican Federal Judicial
Police, not the U.S. immigration officials who later searched his
room in Texas, "threatened to kill him, beat him about the face
and body, poured water through his nostrils while he was
stripped, bound and gagged, and applied electrical shocks to his
wet body, among other things."121 The district judge ruled that
the manner in which the Mexican authorities obtained the de-
fendant's statement "shock[ed] the conscience of the American
court," finding that "[t]he conduct of the Mexican police offi-
cials violated even minimal standards of decency expected in a
civilized society." 122 Remarking that the methods employed
"were 'too close to the rack and the screw' to be acceptable,"
the court granted the motion to suppress. 23
In discussing the above decision, a commentator explained,
"The reason for this exception is that in addition to serving a
118 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
119 Joshua v. DeWitt, 341 F.3d 430, 450 (6th Cir. 2003).
120 677 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Tex. 1987).
121 Id. at 894.
122 Id. at 895.
123 Id. (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)).
Volume 5, Number 1 rall zo11
20
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 3
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol5/iss1/3
25 PEOPLE V. WRICE
deterrent function, the torture exclusionary rule serves an im-
portant secondary function: to preserve the integrity of the judi-
cial process and the honor of the judicial system." 124 This
assessment is harmonious with the oft-quoted passage from the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Rochin v. Califor-
nia,125 wherein deputy sheriffs directed a physician to force an
emetic solution into the accused's stomach in an effort to re-
cover several capsules he had swallowed:
Use of involuntary verbal confessions in State criminal trials is
constitutionally obnoxious not only because of their unreliabil-
ity. They are inadmissible under the Due Process Clause even
though statements contained in them may be independently es-
tablished as true. Coerced confessions offend the community's
sense of fair play and decency. So here, to sanction brutal con-
duct which naturally enough was condemned by the court whose
judgment is before us, would be to afford brutality the cloak of
law. Nothing would be more calculated to discredit law and
thereby to brutalize the temper of a society.126
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights and high
courts from nations around the world have clearly articulated a
uniform rationale for not applying the harmless error doctrine in
criminal cases in which evidence obtained by physical torture is
introduced as substantive evidence of a defendant's guilt. The
underlying policy reason for refusing to permit a conviction to
stand in the face of the use of a confession procured by torture is
that such a practice irreparably tarnishes not only the individual
court proceeding and the legal system in general, but the reputa-
tion of those who acquiesce in its use, most notably the judges
solemnly entrusted with safeguarding the justice process; there-
fore, to preserve the integrity of judicial proceedings, a new trial
that is free from the stain of the tainted evidence is required.
124 Michael P. Scharf, Tainted Provenance: When, If Ever, Should Torture
Evidence Be Admissible?, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 129, 154 (2008).
125 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
126 Id. at 173-74.
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As noted earlier, the European Court has repeatedly re-
marked that to permit a criminal conviction marred by the use
of tortured evidence to stand "would only serve to legitimate
indirectly the sort of morally reprehensible conduct which the
authors of Article 3 of the [European] Convention sought to
proscribe or, in other words, to 'afford brutality the cloak of
law.' "127
Superior tribunals from around the world have reached the
same conclusion. For example, in the celebrated torture deci-
sion of the House of Lords, A and others v. Secretary of State for
the Home Department (No. 2),128 which involved the propriety
of the Secretary of State's submission that statements obtained
abroad by torture should be admissible in appeals to the Special
Immigration Appeals Commission, Lord Hoffmann eloquently
expressed this concept in the opening paragraphs of his opinion:
... The use of torture is dishonourable. It corrupts
and degrades the state which uses it and the legal
system which accepts it. When judicial torture was
routine all over Europe, its rejection by the com-
mon law was a source of national pride and the
admiration of enlightened foreign visitors such as
Voltaire and Beccaria....
... [T]he rejection of torture by the common
law has a special iconic importance as the touch-
stone of a humane and civilised legal system. Not
only that: the abolition of torture, which was used
by the state in Elizabethean and Jacobean times to
obtain evidence admitted in trials before the court
of Star Chamber, was achieved as part of the great
constitutional struggle and civil war which made
the government subject to law. Its rejection has a
127 Harutyunyan v. Armenia, no. 36549/03, 63 (June 28, 2007); Jalloh v. Ger-
many (Gr. Chamber), no. 54810/00, 105 (July 11, 2006).
128 [2006] 2 A.C. 221 (H.L. December 8, 2005).
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constitutional resonance for the English people
which cannot be overestimated. 129
In addressing the rationale underlying the rule prohibiting the
use of such evidence, Lord Hoffmann, after rejecting the claim
that the rule was designed to discipline the executive, explained
that if the purpose of the rule was rather to preserve the integ-
rity of the judicial process,
then the rule must exclude statements obtained by
torture anywhere, since the stain attaching to such
evidence will defile an English court whatever the
nationality of the torturer. I have no doubt that
the purpose of the rule is not to discipline the ex-
ecutive, although this may be an incidental conse-
quence. It is to uphold the integrity of the
administration of justice.13°
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the United States Su-
preme Court has remarked that "[t]he United Kingdom's expe-
rience bears particular relevance ... in light of the historic ties
between our countries ...."131
Another very important torture decision bearing upon this
question is Mthembu v. South Africa.132 Therein, the defendant
was convicted on the basis of evidence obtained from an alleged
accomplice after the police tortured the accomplice by use of
electric shock treatment. 133 The court had to determine whether
the defendant received a fair trial.
In addition to other factors, including compliance with the
United Nation's Torture Convention, the court pointed out that
public policy, in this context, is concerned not only
to ensure that the guilty are held accountable; it is
129 Id. at 81-83 (emphasis added).
130 Id. at 91.
131 Roper v. Simmons, supra note 34, at 577 (2005).
132 25 B.H.R.C. 444 (S. Afr. Sup. Ct., App. Div. April 10, 2008).
133 Id. at 17, 19.
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also concerned with the propriety of the conduct
of investigating and prosecutorial agencies in se-
curing evidence against criminal suspects. It in-
volves considering the nature of the violation and
the impact that evidence obtained as a result
thereof will have, not only on a particular case, but
also on the integrity of the administration of jus-
tice in the long term.134
In reversing outright three of the defendant's convictions be-
cause "[t]he torture has stained the evidence irredeemably" and
because, without such material, there was insufficient evidence
to sustain the convictions, the court made the following conclud-
ing observations:
To admit [the accomplice's] testimony.., would
require us to shut our eyes to the manner in which
the police obtained this information from him.
More seriously, it is tantamount to involving the
judicial process in 'moral defilement.' This 'would
compromise the integrity of the judicial process
(and) dishonour the administration of justice.' In
the long term, the admission of torture-induced
evidence can only have a corrosive effect on the
criminal justice system. The public interest, in my
view, demands its exclusion, irrespective of
whether such evidence has an impact on the fair-
ness of the trial.135
134 Id. at 26.
135 Id. at 34, 36 (footnote omitted). See R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, 31
(Can. Sup. Ct. Apr. 9, 1987) (noting that the pertinent section of the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was designed "to prevent having the
administration of justice brought into further disrepute by the admission of
the evidence in the proceedings"); People (at the suit of the A-G) v. O'Brien,
[1965] I.R. 142, 150 (Ir. Sup. Ct.) (holding that "to countenance the use of
evidence extracted or discovered by gross personal violence would . . . in-
volve the state in moral defilement").
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Most recently, in United States of America v. Khadr, 36 a Ca-
nadian appellate court affirmed the decision of a lower court
judge who stayed extradition committal proceedings because the
granting of the committal order would taint the integrity of the
court due to the requesting state's conduct. Therein, Khadr, a
Canadian citizen, had been abducted in Pakistan, physically
beaten until he cooperated with Pakistani intelligence authori-
ties, who interrogated him for intelligence purposes, and
secretly detained for fourteen months.137 The court found that
the United States had paid Pakistani intelligence officials a half
a million dollars to abduct Khadr and should have been aware
that it was likely that he would be mistreated.138 The FBI then
interrogated Khadr in Pakistan.139 After Khadr was returned to
Canada by Pakistani intelligence, the United States filed terror-
ism-related criminal charges against Khadr and subsequently
sought his extradition from Canada.140
In light of the physical beatings and deprivations suffered by
Khadr in Pakistan, and the statements resulting therefrom, the
superior court judge who conducted the extradition committal
hearing concluded that "the sum of the human rights violations
suffered by Khadr is both shocking and unjustifiable."'141 Ac-
cordingly, the judge stayed the extradition proceedings on the
grounds that to permit the proceedings to continue in the face of
the requesting state's misconduct would constitute an abuse of
the judicial process and "undermines the justice system."' 42 On
appeal, the reviewing judges unanimously affirmed the decision
of the superior court judge to stay the extradition proceedings
136 No. C52633, 2011 ONCA 358 (Can. App. Ct., Ontario, June 5, 2011).
137 Id. at §§ 1, 8.
138 Id.
139 Id. at § 13.
140 Id. at §§ 16-17.
141 Id. at § 2.
142 Id. at §§ 2, 23.
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"in order to protect the integrity of the courts and the judicial
process. "143
Accordingly, in order to preserve the integrity of the judicial
process, the Illinois Supreme Court should, from a policy per-
spective alone,144 soundly reject the notion that a conviction
predicated in any way upon evidence procured by torture can be
sustained.
CONCLUSION
The lessons from international jurisprudence are unmistaka-
ble: the harmless error doctrine is inapplicable to any criminal
case involving the use of a confession extracted by physical tor-
ture, as one can never receive a fair trial under such circum-
stances. Moreover, courts must decline outright any invitation
by prosecutorial authorities to relax the current ban on the use
of such tainted evidence, lest the judiciary bloody its own robes
in complicity and thereby stain the integrity of the judicial
process.
It has been said by prophets of old that "[h]e who ruleth over
men must be just."145 A tribunal that permits a conviction to
stand in the face of the use at trial of a tortured confession for-
feits the title of "court of law." Accordingly, the issue in Wrice
is not simply an academic legal inquiry surrounding the applica-
143 Id. at § 52.
144 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, An Appraisal of Torture in International Law
and Practice: The Need for an International Convention for the Prevention
and Suppression of Torture, in Convention Against Torture: Hearing Before
the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 107,
134 (Jan. 30, 1990) ("[T]he use of torture to secure a conviction by obtaining
otherwise unavailable incriminating evidence ... violates the integrity of the
legal system. The reason is that the integrity of the legal system is indispen-
sable to its credibility and acceptance and thus ultimately to its survival as the
effective means of resolving inter-personal and social conflicts. Accordingly,
torture cannot be rationalized as a means of sustaining the legal system be-
cause it is violative of the integrity of the legal system.").
145 II Samuel 23:3 (King James).
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tion of the doctrine of harmless error; rather, it is a foundational
question of ethics that goes to the very heart of the character of
the judiciary.
The justices of the Illinois Supreme Court can either choose
to remain as conservators of the integrity of the court, or, along
with the State, they will become co-conspirators in torture, giv-
ing legal sanction to police brutality and infecting the judiciary
as an institution by means of moral defilement. In short, there is
no middle ground - the answer is painted in hues of either black
and white or black and blue.
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